

Security Situation in Cabo Delgado (Mozambique)

Briefing: 17 January 2024



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1. Introduction

Cabo Delgado is the northernmost province of Mozambique. Mocímboa da Praia and Palma are the two districts in which gas extraction activities are taking place. Several gas fields are located offshore in the Rovuma Basin,¹ where 180 trillion cubic feet of gas has been discovered since 2010.^{2,3} Mozambique is a new frontier in African gas. It has the highest volume of previously untapped gas reserves in pre-production, according to the Global Oil and Gas Extraction Tracker.⁴ There is one active project in the Rovuma Basin: the Coral South Floating LNG, which is currently exporting gas from an offshore platform.⁵ In the same area, TotalEnergies and its partners started to build the onshore liquefaction facilities for the Mozambique LNG project on the Afungi peninsula but the construction was interrupted due to *force majeure*.⁶ The Cabo Delgado province is also rich in mineral resources, notably rubies and gold.⁷

The province of Cabo Delgado is also the theatre of a brutal conflict. On 11 August 2020 insurgents now known as the Islamic State Mozambique⁸— also known as Ahl al-Sunnah wa al Jamma'ah or ASWJ —⁹ took control of the town of Mocímboa da Praia, forcing the retreat of the Mozambican Army.¹⁰ On 24 March 2021 the insurgents attacked Palma town.¹¹

The attack prompted TotalEnergies to declare *Force Majeure* and withdraw all its personnel from its project site in Afungi.¹² In July 2021 the Southern African Development Community (SADC) military mission was deployed in Cabo Delgado¹³ The Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF)¹⁴, deployed in the same month, supported the Mozambican army to

¹ *Current Areas of Exploration and Production / Exploration & Production / Home*. (n.d.). INP. Retrieved January 18, 2024, from <https://www.inp.gov.mz/en/Exploration-Production/Current-Areas-of-Exploration-and-Production>

² *Mozambique - Country Commercial Guide*. (2022, November 30). International Trade Administration. Retrieved November 17, 2023, from <https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/mozambique-oil-gas-0>

³ *História das Descobertas na Bacia Sedimentar do Rovuma / Descobertas na Bacia do Rovuma / Pesquisa & Produção / Home*. (n.d.). INP. Retrieved January 18, 2024, from <https://www.inp.gov.mz/pt/Pesquisa-Producao/Descobertas-na-Bacia-do-Rovuma/Historia-das-Descobertas-na-Bacia-Sedimentar-do-Rovuma>

⁴ *New Hubs of Gas Extraction in Africa*. (2023, February 14). Global Energy Monitor. Retrieved January 18, 2024, from <https://globalenergymonitor.org/report/changing-of-the-guard-the-new-hubs-of-gas-extraction-in-africa/>

⁵ *Coral South project in Mozambique*. Eni. Retrieved January 24, 2024, from <https://www.eni.com/en-IT/actions/global-activities/mozambique/coral-south.html>

⁶ Total Mozambique LNG Project. Retrieved January 19, 2024, from <https://mzlng.totalenergies.co.mz/en>

⁷ United States Geological Survey. (2023, April 1). The Mineral Industry of Mozambique in 2017-2018. Retrieved January 19, 2024, from <https://pubs.usgs.gov/myb/vol3/2017-18/myb3-2017-18-mozambique.pdf>

⁸ *Actor Profile: Islamic State Mozambique (ISM)*. (2023, October 30). ACLED. Retrieved November 15, 2023, from <https://acleddata.com/2023/10/30/actor-profile-islamic-state-mozambique-ism/>

⁹ *Actor Profile: Islamic State Mozambique (ISM)*. (2023, October 30). ACLED. Retrieved November 15, 2023, from <https://acleddata.com/2023/10/30/actor-profile-islamic-state-mozambique-ism/>

¹⁰ *Cabo Ligado Weekly: 10-16 August 2020*. (2020, August 19). ACLED. Retrieved January 19, 2024, from <https://acleddata.com/2020/08/19/cabo-ligado-weekly-10-16-august-2020/>

¹¹ Lister, Tim. *The March 2021 Palma Attack and the Evolving Jihadi Terror Threat to Mozambique – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point*. Combating Terrorism Center. Retrieved June 2023 from <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-march-2021-palma-attack-and-the-evolving-jihadi-terror-threat-to-mozambique/>.

¹² *Total declares Force Majeure on Mozambique LNG project*. TotalEnergies.com. Retrieved 5 June 2023 from <https://totalenergies.com/media/news/press-releases/total-declares-force-majeure-mozambique-lng-project>

¹³ *SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) in Brief*. (2021, November 10). SADC. Retrieved November 6, 2023, from <https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/sadc-mission-mozambique-samim-brief>

¹⁴ Press statement, Government of Rwanda, 9 July 2021, <https://www.gov.rw/blog-detail/rwanda-deploys-joint-force-to-mozambique>

evict the insurgents from Mocimboa de Praia.¹⁵ The RDF were primarily positioned in the Mocimboa de Praia and Palma districts, which are the areas closest to and around the Mozambique LNG project site in the Afungi peninsula.¹⁶ According to data collected and compiled by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), 998 security incidents involving the insurgents took place in Cabo Delgado between 3 January 2020 and 11 January 2024.

Social inequalities have increased in Cabo Delgado during the period 2015-2020.¹⁷ According to the researcher Joseph Hanlon, “any definitive resolution to the war requires responding to the grievances. Thus far, Mozambique has singularly failed even to recognise the grievances” of the population in Cabo Delgado.¹⁸ The South Africa-based Institute For Security Studies (ISS) writes: “Economic and social inequality, poverty, youth unemployment and political exclusion are some of the factors driving violent extremism in Northern Mozambique”.¹⁹

According to Reuters and Africa Intelligence, financiers are reassessing their commitments to support the \$20 billion Mozambique LNG project,²⁰ which according to TotalEnergies is Africa’s largest foreign direct investment project.²¹ According to Africa Intelligence, TotalEnergies’s CEO, Patrick Pouyanné, recently said “he was reluctant to restart the project if there was a serious possibility that it would have to be shut down again”.²²

2. Current Security Situation

2.1. Active Conflict Zones

Shortly after he visited the Cabo Delgado province in February 2023, Patrick Pouyanné told TotalEnergies’ investors: “what I’ve seen from a security point of view is good, life is back to normal”.²³ In May 2023, TotalEnergies’ “entrusted” rapporteur on the humanitarian situation in Cabo Delgado, Jean-Christophe Rufin, reported that the main road between the Palma and Mocimboa da Praia was secured and that NGOs could operate without escorts.²⁴ The *Observatório do Meio Rural* noted in their June 2023 report that “from Palma to Quionga, Pundandar, Olumbi or Mocimboa da Praia circulation is tranquil and there are no reports of incidents” but that “all TotalEnergies’ staff circulate with a military escort”.²⁵

According to an August 2023 *Centre for Strategic & International Studies* report, the military’s disbanding of insurgents from the urban centres led to their “split up into smaller, more mobile units and shifted operations into areas where foreign troop presence was less robust”, adding complexity to the current scenario.²⁶ Last April the *Institute for Security Studies* shared their view of an insurgency still active in the form of smaller cells, scattered across districts further from the Afungi site —where security was indeed restored— but still capable of coordinating attacks.²⁷

¹⁵ Twitter. Retrieved November 17, 2023 from <https://twitter.com/RwandaMoD/status/1424341781563559944>

¹⁶ Concept Note for an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to support the deployment of the Rwanda Defence Force in Mozambique. Pg. 4. 3 May 2022. Working document 8539/22. European External Action Service. Retrieved 17 April 2023 from <https://drive.google.com/file/d/18rFI4RAVOSPvraBLT5RayDk1ng9mYyV9/view?usp=sharing> ARIA obtained this via a freedom of information request

¹⁷ Barletta G, Ibraimo M, Salvucci V, Sarmento E, Tarp F. (2022). The evolution of inequality in Mozambique: 1996/97–2019/20. WIDER Working Paper 2022/151. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER. <https://doi.org/10.35188/UNU-WIDER/2022/284-3>

¹⁸ *Ignoring the Roots of Mozambique’s War in a Push for Military Victory – ACCORD*. (2021, August 24). ACCORD. Retrieved November 17, 2023, from <https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/ignoring-the-roots-of-mozambiques-war-in-a-push-for-military-victory/>

¹⁹ *Violent extremism in Mozambique: drivers and links to transnational organised crime*. Pg. 14. (2022, September 16). Institute for Security Studies. Retrieved November 6, 2023, from https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar-51_2.pdf

²⁰ Roelf, W. (2023, November 17). Environmental groups urge funding halt for TotalEnergies’ Mozambique project. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/environmental-groups-urge-funding-halt-totalenergies-mozambique-project-2023-11-17/>; Mozambique LNG: TotalEnergies decision on force majeure imminent”. 22.01.2024. *Africa Intelligence*. At <https://www.africaintelligence.com/southern-africa-and-islands/2024/01/22/mozambique-lng-totalenergies-decision-on-force-majeure-imminent.110150339-eve>

²¹ *Total announces the signing of Mozambique LNG project financing*. (n.d.). TotalEnergies.com. Retrieved January 19, 2024, from <https://totalenergies.com/media/news/news/total-announces-signing-mozambique-lng-project-financing>

²² TotalEnergies eyes January for Mozambique LNG relaunch. (2023, November 13). *Africa Intelligence*. The article can be accessed here <https://drive.google.com/file/d/16pQKmcKvgnqDttUQ5mfV2xefGOAnQHaG/view?usp=sharing>

²³ A transcription of the call is available at https://totalenergies.com/sites/g/files/nytnzq121/files/documents/2023-02/TotalEnergies_2022_Results_and_2023_Objectives_transcript.pdf

²⁴ Report on the socioeconomic, humanitarian and human rights situation in the Palma-Afungi-Mocimboa area. (updated 2023, September). Jean-Christophe Rufin and Ingrid Glowacki. Retrieved November 15, 2023 from https://drive.google.com/file/d/1HtrcuTLE_TfF2Bq6zb38f-eE0KkptdiC/view?usp=sharing; TotalEnergies (2023), at <https://totalenergies.com/media/news/press-releases/totalenergies-publishes-jcrufins-report-human-rights-cabo-delgado>


²⁵ *Humanitarian Organizations in the south and TotalEnergies in the northeast: options for Internal Displaced Persons in a context of fragile State* (2023, June 14). Observatório do Meio Rural. Retrieved November 16, 2023, from <https://omrmz.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/DR-242-INGLESE-4.pdf>

²⁶ Larnerd, N. J., & Columbo, E. (2023, August 8). Evaluating Mozambique’s Security, Humanitarian, and Funding Landscape. CSIS. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/evaluating-mozambiques-security-humanitarian-and-funding-landscape>

²⁷ Nhamirre, B. (2023, April 3). Cabo Delgado: two years since the Palma invasion. *ISS Africa*. Retrieved November 15, 2023 from <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/cabo-delgado-two-years-since-the-palma-invasion>

In October 2023 insurgent activity was concentrated in the southern areas of the Mocimboa da Praia district and the districts of Muíumbre and Macomia.²⁸ According to *Cabo Ligado*'s September 2023 report, insurgents are recently resorting to unprecedented attacks using Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), which have targeted military convoys in the districts of Mocimboa da Praia and Macomia. The conflict observatory understands that there has been an increase in the sophistication of the IEDs insurgent attacks.²⁹

On 18 July 2023, the researcher Borges Nhamirre wrote in an ISS report that “the job of securing Cabo Delgado province has only been ‘done’ in the two districts where LNG is being explored and extracted – not even the five districts heavily targeted by insurgents have been secured. This approach risks creating an unsustainable green zone security model, where business and public services flow in a particular area while the surrounding districts remain unstable. This approach creates a permanent threat to economic ventures, with the risk of militants attacking and kidnapping project workers in exchange for ransom.”³⁰



The latest update on the number of security incidents and casualties in Cabo Delgado³¹
ACLED's Cabo Ligado provides an updated dashboard and monthly reports on the security situation³²

²⁸ *Cabo Ligado Update: 16-29 October 2023 — Cabo Ligado*. (2023, November 2). Cabo Ligado. Retrieved November 14, 2023, from <https://www.cabolidado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-update-16-29-october-2023>

²⁹ *Cabo Ligado Monthly: September 2023*. Cabo Ligado. Retrieved November 15, 2023, from <https://www.cabolidado.com/monthly-reports/cabo-ligado-monthly-september-2023>

³⁰ Nhamirre, B. (2023, July 18). Winning talk doesn't mean Mozambique's insurgency is over. *ISS Africa*. <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/winning-talk-doesnt-mean-mozambiques-insurgency-is-over>

³¹ *Cabo Ligado Update: 11 December 2023 - 7 January 2024*. Cabo Ligado. Retrieved January 19, 2024, from <https://www.cabolidado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-update-11-december-7-january>

On 26 December 2023 an IS-linked insurgency major attack killed nine Mozambican soldiers, according to *Cabo Ligado*.³³ According to *Zitamar*, the insurgents claimed responsibility for at least five attacks in Cabo Delgado since the start of 2024 that have killed several civilians and a Doctors Without Borders humanitarian worker.³⁴ A local source told *Zitamar* that the Rwandan soldiers are preventing civilians from fleeing the conflict areas by blocking the roads or instructing the population not to flee.³⁵

2.2. The main actors involved in the conflict

Islamic State Mozambique (ISM): Locally known as Al-Sunnah Wal Jammah (ASWJ) and as *al-Shabab* (The Youth). After occupying Mocimboa de Praia on 11 August 2020, they led an armed attack in Palma town on 24 March 2021, forcing TotalEnergies' to declare *Force Majeure on its Mozambique LNG project*.³⁶ According to *Human Rights Watch*, civilians' human rights were abused by both the Islamic State-linked armed group Al-Shabab and the Mozambican military forces fighting them.³⁷

Mozambique Defence Armed Forces (FADM): they are the primary security force of Mozambique. Mozambique requested two foreign interventions (SADC³⁸ and Rwanda³⁹) plus a training mission (EUTM)⁴⁰ to support their fight against the insurgents. In addition to Amnesty International's accusation of FADM committing acts of violence against civilians,⁴¹ other organisations such as the Observatório do Meio Rural point to an elevated mistrust between the local population and the Mozambican forces,⁴² adding to a general perception of their unreliability.

SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM): it was deployed on 15 July 2021 to support the FADM in fighting the insurgents at the invitation of the Mozambican Government.⁴³ It comprises about 1,900⁴⁴ personnel from eight African countries.⁴⁵ Some coordination problems between the SADC troops and the Rwandan forces have been reported in the media.⁴⁶ According to a *Zitamar* report from July 2023, SADC was considering the withdrawal of its forces despite a recent leaked SADC assessment that described the security situation in Cabo Delgado as "unpredictable".⁴⁷ According to Amnesty International, SADC soldiers mistreated the bodies of the dead.⁴⁸ Indeed, in January 2023, a video showing the burning of bodies by military officers spread on social media.⁴⁹

³² *Dashboard — Cabo Ligado*. Retrieved January 25, 2024, from <https://www.caboligado.com/dashboard>

³³ Cabo Ligado Update: 11 December 2023-7 January 2024 — Cabo Ligado. (2024, January 11). Cabo Ligado. Retrieved January 19, 2024, from <https://www.caboligado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-update-11-december-7-january>

³⁴ Gould, T. (2024, January 8). Rwandans prevent exodus from Mocimboa da Praia as insurgents near district capital. *Zitamar News*. <https://www.zitamar.com/rwandans-prevent-exodus-from-mocimboa-da-praia-as-insurgents-near-district-capital/>

³⁵ Gould, T. (2024, January 8). Rwandans prevent exodus from Mocimboa da Praia as insurgents near district capital. *Zitamar News*. <https://www.zitamar.com/rwandans-prevent-exodus-from-mocimboa-da-praia-as-insurgents-near-district-capital/>

³⁶ African Union. (13 August 2020). Preliminary Report. Retrieved January 19, 2024, from <https://caert.org.dz/incident-reports/Mozambique%20August%202020.pdf>

³⁷ *Southern African Leaders Silent over Abuses in Mozambique*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved November 17, 2023, from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/08/18/southern-african-leaders-silent-over-abuses-mozambique>

³⁸ *SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) in Brief*. (2021, November 10). SADC. Retrieved January 19, 2024, from <https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/sadc-mission-mozambique-samim-brief>

³⁹ *Rwanda deploys Joint Force to Mozambique*. (2021, July 10). MOD. Retrieved January 19, 2024, from <https://www.mod.gov.rw/news-detail/rwanda-deploys-joint-force-to-mozambique-1>

⁴⁰ *EUTM Mozambique | EEAS*. (2023, March 6). EEAS. Retrieved January 19, 2024, from https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eutm-mozambique_en

⁴¹ *Mozambique: Civilians killed as war crimes committed by armed group, government forces, and private military contractors – new report*. Amnesty International. Retrieved November 15, 2023, from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/03/mozambique-civilians-killed-as-war-crimes-committed-by-armed-group-government-forces-and-private-military-contractors-new-report/>

⁴² *Humanitarian Organizations in the south and TotalEnergies in the northeast: options for Internal Displaced Persons in a context of fragile State* (2023, June 14). Observatório do Meio Rural. Retrieved November 16, 2023, from <https://omrmz.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/DR-242-INGLES-4.pdf>

⁴³ *SAMIM in Cabo Delgado: what lessons for political and strategic coherence?* (2023, October 1). Page 1. Challenges Forum. Retrieved January 26, 2024, from https://challengesforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/CAF23_BGpaper_wg1_SAMIM-1.pdf

⁴⁴ Nhamirre, B. (2023, April 3). Cabo Delgado: two years since the Palma invasion. *ISS Africa*. Retrieved November 15, 2023 from <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/cabo-delgado-two-years-since-the-palma-invasion>

⁴⁵ *SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) in Brief*. (2021, November 10). SADC. Retrieved November 15, 2023, from <https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/sadc-mission-mozambique-samim-brief>

⁴⁶ Fabricius, P. (2022, January 13). Failure to coordinate SADC and Rwandan military missions in Mozambique 'jeopardising fight against insurgents'. *Daily Maverick*. Retrieved November 17, 2023 from <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-01-13-failure-to-coordinate-sadc-and-rwandan-military-missions-in-mozambique-could-jeopardise-fight-against-insurgents/>

⁴⁷ Gould, T., & Graham, F. (2023, July 13). SADC plans to withdraw troops from Cabo Delgado by July 2024. *Zitamar News*. <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1sVWWYtheF-Pknglq8W7mxO4pjZYL4KV5/view?usp=sharing>

⁴⁸ Amnesty International (2022). *Mozambique: Video showing soldiers burning corpses is latest evidence of atrocities in forgotten war in Cabo Delgado*. From <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/01/mozambique-video-showing-soldiers-burning-corpses/>

⁴⁹ Amnesty International (2022). *Mozambique: Video showing soldiers burning corpses is latest evidence of atrocities in forgotten war in Cabo Delgado*. From <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/01/mozambique-video-showing-soldiers-burning-corpses/>

Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF): according to a concept note sent by the European External Action Service to its Delegations, the Rwandan troops were primarily deployed in the two districts closest to TotalEnergies' project site.⁵⁰ The deployment started on 9 July 2021. They entered the conflict by taking back Mocímboa de Praia in a short period. This led to improved security and helped them earn the local population's trust, according to the *Observatório do Meio Rural*.⁵¹ The Rwandan security presence in Mozambique coincided with two killings, one enforced disappearance and two attempted kidnappings targeting Rwandans in Mozambique since May 2021. Several Rwandan refugees there said Rwandan embassy officials threatened them.⁵² On 5 June 2023, Major General Alex Kagame was appointed Commander of the Rwandan Joint Task Force in Mozambique.⁵³ A week later, a UN group of experts published a report exposing the involvement of Rwandan forces in DR Congo in support of the sanctioned armed group M23. In this report, Alex Kagame was mentioned as having "commanded several RDF operations on the Democratic Republic of the Congo territory in 2022".⁵⁴ Although the accusations in this report led to the approval of sanctions by the EU and the US, Human Rights Watch called for sanctions on more "senior leaders and officials".⁵⁵

Private Military Contractors (PMC): several private military security companies including the Russian Wagner Group⁵⁶ have allegedly been active in Cabo Delgado in the course of the conflict, sometimes simultaneously. The South African Dyck Advisory Group (DAG) played a key role in organising rescue missions during the attacks in Palma. It operated in Cabo Delgado from April 2020 until April 2021 when, according to one of its executives, the Mozambican government decided not to renew the contract.⁵⁷

The European Union: In 2021, The EU launched a military training mission in Mozambique.⁵⁸ Until today, it has approved three aid funds packages to support the Mozambican Armed Forces, the Rwandan forces and the SADC forces (totalling €124 million)⁵⁹ after Maputo's demand and acknowledgement of their need to improve their capabilities to combat the insurgency and reassert security in Cabo Delgado after the Palma attack.⁶⁰

2.3. Is TotalEnergies a party to the conflict?

In May 2021, the CEO of TotalEnergies told the company's investors at the AGM: "I would like to put an end to any idea that Total has ever and will ever recruit or finance any operation of a military nature, whether it be by a government or a private militia. There are extremely clear principles: we can provide humanitarian assistance, but certainly not take part in an armed conflict."⁶¹

However, according to Jean-Christophe Rufin's report updated in September 2023, approximately 600 troops from the FADM - organised as a Joint Task Force (JTF) - are stationed at the Mozambique LNG site and its surrounding area⁶². According to the Memorandum of Understanding between TotalEnergies and the Mozambican government amended in

⁵⁰ Concept Note for an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to support the deployment of the Rwanda Defence Force in Mozambique. 3 May 2022. Working document 8539/22. European External Action Service. Retrieved 15 November 2023 from <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Isla4uogvVUBCinTbHDDrf-AfuK92WC/view?usp=sharing>

⁵¹ *Return of the populations and reconstruction of the northeast of Cabo Delgado —from the weakening of the State to the emergence of 'Totaland'* (2023, March 6). Observatório do Meio Rural. Retrieved November 15, 2023, from <https://omrmz.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/DR-211-Return-of-the-populations-and-reconstruction-of-the-Northeast-of-Cabo-Delgado.pdf>

⁵² "Join Us or Die": Rwanda's Extraterritorial Repression | HRW. (2023, October 10). Human Rights Watch. Retrieved November 15, 2023, from <https://www.hrw.org/report/2023/10/10/join-us-or-die/rwandas-extraterritorial-repression>

⁵³ Twitter. Retrieved November 17, 2023, from <https://twitter.com/UrugwiroVillage/status/1665836952241819648?ref=zitamar.com>

⁵⁴ A full version of the report can be consulted from https://drive.google.com/file/d/10VVvs08ObZNZEMH0_CgCSWCHI7ig8oucV/view (p. 17 ; Annexes 32-35 p. 114 - 123)

⁵⁵ *US Sanctions Rights Abusers in Eastern Congo*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved November 17, 2023, from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/08/28/us-sanctions-rights-abusers-eastern-congo>

⁵⁶ *Russia's Wagner Group in Africa: Influence, commercial concessions, rights violations, and counterinsurgency failure* | Brookings. (2022, February 8). Brookings Institution. Retrieved November 16, 2023, from <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/>

⁵⁷ Fabricius, P. (2021, March 31). SA military company in insurgent combat zone, the Dyck Advisory Group, will not extend contract with Mozambique. *Daily Maverick*. A copy of the article can be consulted in

<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JG4DyjQFvxH6GBiv6SgDIWNIObLCQDn6/view?usp=sharing>

⁵⁸ *Foreign Affairs Council, 12 July 2021*. Retrieved November 15, 2023, from

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2021/07/12/>

⁵⁹ *European Peace Facility: Council adopts assistance measures in support of the armed forces of five countries*. (2022, December 1). EEAS. Retrieved January 22, 2024, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/01/european-peace-facility-council-adopts-assistance-measures-in-support-of-the-armed-forces-of-five-countries/>

⁶⁰ Cover note recommending for support to the SADC Mission in Mozambique. 10 August 2022. Working document 11772/22. European External Action Service. Retrieved 17 April 2023 from

<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1HR0UvHzGdVq4PvuNpEq8Jk2PWF5NU7S/view?usp=sharing>

⁶¹ Retrieved from the AGM recording: <https://twitter.com/TotalEnergies/status/1398187269341782017> (from 2h18). This quote is a translation, please refer to the original recording.

⁶² Report on the socioeconomic, humanitarian and human rights situation in the Palma-Afungi-Mocímboa area. (updated 2023, September). Jean-Christophe Rufin and Ingrid Glowacki. Retrieved November 15, 2023 from https://drive.google.com/file/d/1HtrcuTLE_TfF2Bq6zb38f-eE0KkptdC/view?usp=sharing

2020, the fossil fuel company provides the JTF with food, equipment and financial compensation.⁶³ In this report, Rufin warns that “*a permanent link between Mozambique LNG and the Mozambican army would have the effect (...) of making the project a party to the conflict*”.⁶⁴ Hence, their set of recommendations included cutting off “*any direct link between the consortium and the Mozambican army*”.⁶⁵ In March 2021, Amnesty International accused the Mozambican security forces of war crimes.⁶⁶ A video documentary produced by the French company Yemaya Productions shows evidence of TotalEnergies facilities being used as a base camp for the Rwandan army.⁶⁷ The footage indicates that Rwandan troops are operating within the Mozambique LNG facilities, including having their meals in the dining hall. “*We are here to secure the site*”,⁶⁸ argues one of the soldiers speaking on camera.

In July 2023 the non-profit UpRights published an independent review of the human rights due diligence process of the Mozambique LNG project. They concluded that TotalEnergies’ human rights due diligence processes failed to “*accurately assess the potential human rights impact of the Project on the security situation of the communities vis-à-vis the insurgents and the Mozambique security forces*”, and to “*assess the real risk of being considered complicit in international humanitarian law violations or war crimes allegedly committed by the Mozambican armed forces*”.⁶⁹

In October 2023 TotalEnergies was accused in a criminal complaint filed with French prosecutors of involuntary manslaughter by survivors of the 2021 insurgent attack in Palma. According to the *Financial Times*, the plaintiffs allege that “*the company failed to warn subcontractors of the attack, lacked a proper security plan for evacuating the LNG project, and refused to give fuel*” to the private security contractors that attempted a helicopter rescue during the attacks.⁷⁰ One of the plaintiffs, Nick Alexander, who survived the attacks in Palma, told Fortune: “*This is one of the wealthiest companies in the world. You don’t just walk away*”.⁷¹ TotalEnergies has categorically rejected these accusations.⁷²

TotalEnergies isn’t the only company involved in Mozambique LNG questioned for its security assessment. Upon concerns raised by Dutch Parliamentarians, who requested an independent investigation into the ECA support provided by Atradius DSB (the Dutch public export credit agency), the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs commissioned an independent review of financial support to the Mozambique LNG project. The report, published in February 2023, identified flaws in Atradius DSB’s assessment of the security situation, and of the impact of the gas project on the conflict in Cabo Delgado.⁷³

⁶³ Report on the socioeconomic, humanitarian and human rights situation in the Palma-Afungi-Mocímboa area. (updated 2023, September). Jean-Christophe Rufin and Ingrid Glowacki. Retrieved November 15, 2023 from https://drive.google.com/file/d/1HtrcuTLE_TfF2Bq6zb38f-eE0KkptdiC/view?usp=sharing

⁶⁴ Report on the socioeconomic, humanitarian and human rights situation in the Palma-Afungi-Mocímboa area. Pg. 20. (updated 2023, September). Jean-Christophe Rufin and Ingrid Glowacki. Retrieved November 15, 2023 from https://drive.google.com/file/d/1HtrcuTLE_TfF2Bq6zb38f-eE0KkptdiC/view?usp=sharing

⁶⁵ Report on the socioeconomic, humanitarian and human rights situation in the Palma-Afungi-Mocímboa area. Pg. 44. (updated 2023, September). Jean-Christophe Rufin and Ingrid Glowacki. Retrieved November 15, 2023 from https://drive.google.com/file/d/1HtrcuTLE_TfF2Bq6zb38f-eE0KkptdiC/view?usp=sharing

⁶⁶ Mozambique: Civilians killed as war crimes committed by armed group, government forces, and private military contractors – new report. Amnesty International. Retrieved November 15, 2023, from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/03/mozambique-civilians-killed-as-war-crimes-committed-by-armed-group-government-forces-and-private-military-contractors-new-report/>

⁶⁷ Java Discover. (2023, November 7). *Mozambique: From Violence to Violence*. Sequence starts on min. 18:30. Youtube. Retrieved January 17, 2024, from <https://youtu.be/cELDinxUHQs?t=1108>

⁶⁸ Java Discover. (2023, November 7). *Mozambique: From Violence to Violence*. Sequence starts on min. 19:45.. <https://youtu.be/cELDinxUHQs?t=1187>

⁶⁹ *UpRights Welcomes the Publication of the Report on the HRDD of the LNG Project by TotalEnergies*. UpRights. Retrieved November 16, 2023, from <https://www.uprights.org/news/uprights-welcomes-the-publication-of-the-report-assessing-the-human-rights-due-diligence-process-of-the-mozambique-liquefied-natural-gas-project-by-totalenergies>

⁷⁰ Total accused of involuntary manslaughter over 2021 Mozambique attack. (2023, October 10). *Financial Times*. A copy of the article can be consulted in <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1J5kCy33wPYK2GrBrryo6puEvRDLZQ5mX/view?usp=sharing>

⁷¹ *Walt, V. (2023, October 10). It was one of the deadliest terror attacks since 9/11. Survivors say France’s biggest energy company left them to face it alone. Fortune (via Yahoo Finance). https://finance.yahoo.com/news/one-deadliest-terror-attacks-since-081328571.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLnNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAK5e0tx1iX55mqQ-oDg3sT-EzpLL00CWuswhWXHkkl-KSO_e2b8Quo4CORSt1ITabNLZnONMGOKAKhy9PQXKgUiPgyHGz9*

⁷² *Mozambique LNG: TotalEnergies’ response*. (2023, October 11). TotalEnergies.com. Retrieved November 16, 2023, from <https://totalenergies.com/media/news/press-releases/mozambique-lng-totalenergies-response>

⁷³ *Aanbiedingsbrief rapport veiligheidssituatie LNG-project Mozambique | Kamerstuk*. (2023, June 19). Rijksoverheid. Retrieved November 16, 2023, from <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2023/06/19/rapport-proximities-incl-aanbiedingsbrief> An AI translation of the executive summary is available here <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1KI9ySNw5rmocTGF0WysHczZ87O2b49Ce/view?usp=sharing>

3. Humanitarian Impact

Over a million people have been displaced since the beginning of the conflict in 2017.⁷⁴ In a May 2023 report, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs stated that approximately 80% of the displaced population in Cabo Delgado, Nampula and Niassa were women and children.⁷⁵ The latter were especially affected: they had no access to education and healthcare, and their rights and safety were compromised by the conflict's violence.⁷⁶

In the first half of 2022, displacement figures had increased by 20% to a total of 946,508, due to violence perpetrated by non-state armed groups.⁷⁷ In July 2023, there were 834,000 internally displaced persons (IDP) in northern Mozambique (3,000 in Balama, 81,000 in Montepuez, 90,000 in Mueda, 70,000 in Nangade, 117 in Palma, 13,000 in Muidumbe, 78,000 in Macomia, 10,000 in Meluco, 25,000 in Quissanga, 43,000 in Ancuabe, 139,000 in Metuge, 30,000 in Chiure and 4,000 in Mecufi), 81,500 of whom were living in districts of origin but not at their homes; 544,000 lived in host communities and 29,400 in 99 accommodation sites, while 420,000 people returned to their community of origin.⁷⁸

In the North, when IDPs return to their lives, they lack public services and state help which are key to human resettlement.⁷⁹ The state and non-governmental organisations are absent, and the humanitarian situation is left to be handled by TotalEnergies.⁸⁰ According to an Observatório do Meio Rural report published in June 2023, in an envisaged scenario in which large gas investment returns to Cabo Delgado there are no expectations of public services improvements, initiatives to protect youth, opening channels of participation and access to justice or strengthening of the rule of law.⁸¹ By October 2023, 7,000 people were newly displaced in north-eastern Cabo Delgado due to attacks, and/ or the fear of attacks.⁸²



⁷⁴ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (24-05-2023). *Country Profile Mozambique*. Retrieved November 15, 2023. from <https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/mozambique>

⁷⁵ OCHA. (May 2023). Mozambique: Cabo Delgado, Nampula & Niassa Humanitarian Snapshot - January-March 2023. At <https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/mozambique-cabo-delgado-nampula-niassa-humanitarian-snapshot-january-march-2023>

⁷⁶ CARE. (31-10-2023). Mozambique: Six years into the conflict, women and girls in Cabo Delgado are still bearing the brunt of the crisis. From

<https://www.care-international.org/stories/mozambique-six-years-conflict-women-and-girls-cabo-delgado-are-still-bearing-brunt-crisis#:~:text=Cabo%20Delgado%2C%20a%20province%20in,a%20result%20of%20insurgent%20activity>.

⁷⁷ UNHCR. (04-10-2022). "Nearly 1 million people have fled five years of northern Mozambique violence". From <https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing-notes/nearly-1-million-people-have-fled-five-years-northern-mozambique-violence>;

<file:///Users/almarinaldi/Downloads/UNHCR%20Mozambique%20Cabo%20Delgado%20IDP%20response%20December%202022%20-%20Eng.pdf>; ACAPS (July 2023) Retrieved November 15, 2023 from

https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20230707_ACAPS_Thematic_report_Mozambique_impact_of_the_five-year_conflict_in_Cabo_Delgado.pdf

⁷⁸ OCHA. (July 2023). Mozambique: Cabo Delgado, Nampula & Niassa Humanitarian Snapshot - July 2023. From https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/mozambique-cabo-delgado-nampula-niassa-humanitarian-snapshot-july-2023&sa=D&source=docs&ust=1700063592369012&usg=AOvVaw2W5CHIMaOije-M2S70__DH

⁷⁹ Observatório do Meio Rural. (March 2023). From https://omrmz.org/destaque_rural/dr-211-regresso-das-populacoes-e-reconstrucao-do-nordeste-de-cabo-delgado-da-fragilizacao-do-estado-a-emergencia-de-uma-totalandia-english-version-available/

⁸⁰ Observatório do Meio Rural. (June 2023). From https://omrmz.org/destaque_rural/dr-242-organizacoes-humanitarias-a-sul-e-totalenergias-a-nordeste-opcoes-dos-deslocados-internos-num-contexto-de-estado-fragil/

⁸¹ Feijó, J., Maquenzi, J. & Balane, N. (14 June 2023). "ORGANIZAÇÕES HUMANITÁRIAS A SUL E TOTALENERGIES A NORDESTE: OPÇÕES DOS DESLOCADOS INTERNOS NUM CONTEXTO DE ESTADO FRÁGIL". At <https://omrmz.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/DR-242-1.pdf> An English version of the report's executive summary can be found in https://omrmz.org/destaque_rural/dr-242-organizacoes-humanitarias-a-sul-e-totalenergias-a-nordeste-opcoes-dos-deslocados-internos-num-contexto-de-estado-fragil/

⁸² Mozambique – Displacement in Cabo Delgado Flash Update No. 1 (As of 02 October 2023) - Mozambique. (2023, October 5). ReliefWeb. Retrieved January 22, 2024, from <https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/mozambique-displacement-cabo-delgado-flash-update-no-1-02-october-2023>